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1. Cross-Sectoral Collaboration for Economic Growth 
and the Creation of New Jobs  
In globalised labour markets, the creation of new jobs 
is a pressing issue that calls for new ways of formulat-
ing employment policies. Not only does globalisation 
entail redistribution of employment opportunities 
when national labour markets become part of transna-
tional and regional job markets, but governments also 
find their powers limited in regulating employment. 
Public sector experiences alone and hierarchical “one 
size fits all” policies do not appear to be sufficient for 
meeting these challenges. The failure of a market solu-
tion is equally obvious. In fact, the dysfunctions of sup-
posedly self-regulating markets seem to have caused 
the rapid job losses of past decades. When public-
private and global interdependencies appear as all the 
more salient, new forms of pooling resources and 
“know how” from the market and the public sector are 
a logical response to labour market complexity. 
There are particularly high expectations among pol-
icymakers and politicians with regard to cross-sectoral 
policy making. Making the most of the complementary 
strengths of sectoral actors is expected to guarantee 
innovative and sustainable solutions to problems. Par-
adoxically, however, some research findings indicate 
that same-sector collaboration may be far more suc-
cessful than working with actors from different sectors. 
For example, same-sector partners cooperate in a 
more effective way, leading to successful policy out-
comes—they simply seem to get along better with 
each other (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 689). Manag-
ing the differences between actors with divergent sec-
toral backgrounds is, therefore, not only a challenge for 
the individual organisations involved in participation, but 
also for the overall management of the joint effort.  
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The question that this paper addresses is the role of 
the management rationale in facilitating and impeding 
cross-sectoral collaboration, and, more precisely, how 
the mismatch between the management rationale and 
the sectoral orientations of the actors affects vital condi-
tions for collaboration. This mismatch is defined as a sit-
uation where the overall management rationale and an 
actor’s orientation are guided by different sector logics. 
The aim of the discussion below is to advance the 
scholarly debate about conditions for successful cross-
sectoral policy co-operation. The first section of the pa-
per contextualises the research question of management 
rationale and mismatch in current scholarly debates on 
management/administrative styles. This is followed by a 
description of the empirical cases and data. The third 
part of the paper consists of the presentation of two 
case studies, mapping working processes in two instanc-
es of cross-sectoral collaboration. The fourth section 
summaries and analyses the main empirical findings. 
2. Cross-Sectoral Collaboration for Employment 
Creation  
Research shows that the use of solutions inspired by 
the private sector, such as outsourcing, contracting out 
and quasi-market models for employment creation in 
Australia, Holland and Denmark, have not resulted in 
higher efficiency and innovation or less bureaucracy, in 
comparison with public sector solutions (Bredgaard & 
Larsen, 2011). Instead, an increasingly popular alterna-
tive, which is exemplified by the EU employment strat-
egy, Boston’s workforce system in the U.S. (Herranz, 
2007) and the Swedish policy for economic growth and 
jobs, involves various hybrid forms of joint public-private 
co-operation. These are seen as a promising approach to 
employment creation, workforce development and inte-
gration of socio-economically marginalised groups in the 
labour market.  
In theory, cross-sectoral partnerships not only “en-
able public agencies to tackle social problems more ef-
fectively by unlocking the benefits of comparative ad-
vantage” (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 680), but by 
enhancing reciprocity and mutual learning, they also 
build future cross-sectoral problem solving capacity 
(Innes & Booher, 2003). Pooling resources helps to en-
hance innovation potential by making the most of 
complementary strengths and synergy effects of di-
verse competencies and knowledge on the part of dif-
ferent sectoral actors. Sometimes this form of new 
public governance (NPG) is also labelled “good govern-
ance”, since it involves using networks and partner-
ships between governments, business corporations 
and civil society associations to govern society in a 
more effective and legitimate way by including a wide 
range of societal stakeholders in policymaking and im-
plementation (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, pp. 21-22).  
For an individual stakeholder, the incentive for par-
ticipation in a joint project can be the potential gains 
and costs related to participation, and the action is “a 
result of choices based on calculated self-interest” 
(March & Olsen, 1984, p. 734). Collaboration is used in-
strumentally, for example as a way of acquiring new 
competencies or of gaining access to new economic re-
sources. Alternatively, beyond the realm of the rational 
intentions, a stakeholder may be driven primarily by 
role expectations and shared norms in its organisation-
al milieu, i.e. by what is understood as an ‘appropriate’ 
way of acting (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 289). This 
might, for example, involve living up to expectations of 
market efficiency or allowing actions to be guided by 
public sector rule of accountability.  
Several factors may nevertheless undermine the 
benefits of cross-sectoral collaboration aiming at inno-
vative and cost-efficient approaches to job creation. 
Fear on the part of an actor of being co-opted and los-
ing legitimacy may effectively prevent it from getting 
involved in joint action (Hendriks, 2009), as may the 
prospect of losing rather than winning economic and 
human resources (Sörensen & Torfing, 2007). In addi-
tion, participation may be felt to be somehow inappro-
priate if it goes against the role expectations and 
norms that the actor follows.  
In addition, the very mix of divergent sector back-
grounds of participating actors constitutes a specific 
challenge for cross-sectoral co-operation, sometimes 
creating conditions that can jeopardise expected posi-
tive outcomes. Since criteria of success differ among 
corporate, government and civil society organisations, 
it may even be a challenge to establish shared outcome 
criteria for successful collaboration (Selsky & Parker, 
2005, p. 864).  
It is, then, reasonable to argue that the overall 
management of a cross-sectoral initiative appears to 
be a key factor in facilitating a collaborative process. 
Therefore, the research question here addresses the 
role of management rationale in cross-sectoral policy-
making, and especially the possible effects of a mis-
match between the public/private sector orientations 
of participating organisations, with their respective 
values, norms and prescribed administrative processes 
on the one hand, and the overall management ra-
tionale of the joint cross-collaboration on the other. 
Indeed, network management research has been 
criticised for not fully recognising the importance of 
sectoral differences and instead tending to assume 
that organisations behave in a similar manner within a 
network, regardless of whether they are governmental, 
non-profit or business organisations (Herranz, 2007, p. 
26). One possible explanation may be found in the 
widely shared prescriptive and descriptive understand-
ings of recent organisational developments.  
When organisations are conceptualised as open 
systems in continuous interaction with other organisa-
tions in order to exchange resources, personnel and 
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ideas (DiMaggio, 1988; Scott, 1995, 2003), the in-
creased popularity of NPM during past decades, to-
gether with opting out and privatisation of public sec-
tor competencies and tasks, can be seen as resulting in 
a situation where business companies and public sec-
tor bodies become increasingly “multiply embedded”, 
as they adopt a “role or function traditionally associat-
ed with another sector” (Selsky & Parker, 2005, pp. 
851-853). Since learning and borrowing from organisa-
tions in sectors other than one´s own becomes essen-
tial, this eventually gives rise to blurred roles and func-
tions. The idea of converting sector logics, however, 
easily overshadows the fact that public and private sec-
tors still display fundamental differences as different or-
ganisational fields and that when actors with different 
sector backgrounds focus on an issue, they “are likely to 
think about it differently, to be motivated by different 
goals, and to use different approaches” (Selsky & Parker 
2005, p. 851). Even though all organisations are “public” 
in a sense that they are to a varying extent influenced by 
political authority (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994), it is 
still useful to make an analytical distinction between 
the public and private sectors. 
As organisational fields, the public and market sec-
tors each display their own rationale and ideas of what 
is an appropriate way to act, what are reasonable solu-
tions, and how success should be measured (cp. March 
& Olsen, 1984, 2006). Private companies operating in 
the market sector are traditionally associated with the 
entrepreneurial orientation embodied in the main goal 
of profit maximising and vales of customer and market 
focus. The public sector, represented by governments 
and public sector agencies but also including such pub-
lic bodies as state-owned universities and research in-
stitutes, normally operates instead through hierarchi-
cally organised processes so as to follow accountability 
rules in implementing government policies. 
Given the differences between the public and pri-
vate sectors in what constitute their main goals and or-
ganisational processes (Herranz, 2010), it is not surpris-
ing that cross-sectoral collaboration, while at best 
generating new innovative products and solutions to 
societal problems, also faces greater challenges than, 
for example, same-sector public-public partnerships. 
According to a study of effectiveness, efficiency and 
equity in a large number of UK partnerships, public-
public partnerships perform best on effectiveness, 
while cross-sectoral public-private partnerships are less 
effective (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 689). What, 
then, explains this result? Researchers argue that “pub-
lic-public partnerships may work on a more promising 
agenda or else just get along better than the alterna-
tives” (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 694). Sharing sec-
tor-specific norms and understandings of appropriate 
ways of acting seems to make it easier for the organi-
sations to succeed in their collaboration.  
To meet these challenges of divergent appropriate-
ness logics, knowledge and experiences, which are con-
ducive to cross-sectoral co-operation and the very rea-
son it appears so attractive in terms of high potential for 
innovation, the overall management plays a central role 
in facilitating smooth administrative processes. As re-
search shows, sector rationales—bureaucratic and en-
trepreneurial, respectively—are not only embodied at 
the organisational level but also inform the management 
approach at the level of collaboration (Herranz, 2007, 
2010). Herranz notes knowledge of “how different types 
of managerial co-ordination relate to network outcomes 
is still relatively limited” (Herranz, 2010, p. 447).  
At present, the bulk of scholarly debate on public 
sector reforms focuses on three main models for public 
sector management/administration: New Public Gov-
ernance (NPG) as a distinctly different model from New 
Public Management (NPM) and what is labelled the 
Neo-Weberian State (NWS) (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, 
pp. 21-22). At the heart of the debate is an intense dis-
pute over the term “bureaucracy”, which supporters of 
NPM tend to associate with the defects of public sector 
management, while promoting as a solution the entre-
preneurial management ideal inspired by market sec-
tor values and ideology, and which is often defined in 
opposition to what is seen as “impersonal, procedural, 
hierarchical and technical organization of the Weberian 
bureau” (du Gay, 2000, p. 6). Critics see a risk for sim-
plistic descriptions of bureaucratic forms of organisa-
tion. In contrast to picturing bureaucracy as a static 
model, “a single, universal bureaucratic regime of public 
administration”, it is instead a “many-sided, evolving, di-
versified organizational device” (du Gay, 2005, p. 3), var-
ying as a result of divergent constitutional solutions.  
While keeping in the mind the real-life complexity 
and variation in different administrative solutions, it 
will still be necessary, in order to examine the effects 
of the mismatch between participants’ sector orienta-
tions and the management rationale, to identity the 
core characteristics of the two main ways of managing 
cross-sectoral collaboration: the bureaucratic man-
agement rationale and the entrepreneurial one.  
According to Goodsell, although bureaux/state ad-
ministrations vary in make-up, they still most likely 
share the “classic Weberian characteristics of graded 
hierarchy, formal rules, specialized tasks, written files, 
and full-time, trained salaried, career employees” and 
embody a vertical line of authority in order to assure 
external control and accountability (Goodsell, 2005, p. 
18). In other words, these traits can be said to describe 
the classical Weberian bureaucratic management style. 
Following Pollitt and Bouckaert, we identity central 
traits for the “market-type mechanism”, i.e., the use of 
performance indicators, targets, competitive contracts, 
“quasi-markets”, which also define the entrepreneurial 
management rationale as a distinct form, separate 
from the co-ordination mechanism of the Weberian 
bureaucratic style that exercises authority through a 
 Politics and Governance, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 43-56 46 
state-centred, disciplined hierarchy (Pollitt & Boucka-
ert, 2011, p. 22).  
Guided by the preceding ideas of administra-
tive/management solutions and Herranz’s distinction 
between the bureaucratic management style that em-
phases “formalised inter-organisational relations based 
on contracts or standardised procedures and the en-
trepreneurial management style”, inspired the by ide-
als of a private sector organisation, in his model of 
Strategic Orientation Values Sets (Herranz, 2007, p. 
10), we summarise the central elements of each man-
agement rationale in Table 1. 
While the ideology of bureaucratic management is 
based on legislative order, the entrepreneurial style is 
recognised by its efficiency and market focus, with 
economic value maximisation as its vital goal. For the 
bureaucratic rationale, embodying the Weberian ideal, 
the main objective is instead to implement government 
policies and to be accountable for that.  
How, then, should the control of cross-sectoral col-
laboration ideally be formed? Here, the two models of-
fer different solutions: the bureaucratic rationale pre-
scribes centralised rule-based control, while the 
entrepreneurial one favours quasi-centralised control, 
thus providing more leeway to the collaborators. Struc-
ture, one of the two remaining parameters, is closely 
related to control and refers either to a hierarchical 
process or to a process relying on the delegation of 
powers to those participating in the joint action. Final-
ly, decision-making tends, in the case of bureaucratic 
management rationale, to follow a top-down process 
as the entrepreneurial co-ordination exhibits a flexible 
and ad hoc-based way of taking decisions, ultimately 
dictated by the incentives of value maximisation. Thus, 
the entrepreneurial rationale places the emphasis on 
management by incentives related to performance 
goals and grants the cross-sectoral collaboration and 
the sectoral actors involved broad powers in designing 
the joint activities. The bureaucratic rationale largely 
entails a different form of management praxis, with its 
top-down co-ordination based on formalised proce-
dures, written contracts and systems for accountability 
reports in relation to the implementation of policy ob-
jectives (Herranz, 2007, 2010). 
Herranz’s empirical findings show that the choice of 
management style makes a difference: bureaucratic 
style is associated with low performance, both at the 
level of the participating actor and at the level of multi-
sectoral collaboration, while entrepreneurial manage-
ment correlates with moderate to high performance. A 
main conclusion is that more attention needs to be 
paid to the multi-sectoral mix of collaborators in rela-
tion to the co-ordination style when explaining collabo-
rative outcomes (Herranz, 2010, pp. 456-457). Given 
that management rationale appears to be such an im-
portant factor in explaining successful cross-sectoral 
collaboration, it is not surprising that the topic has, ac-
cording to critics, received too little attention (Selsky & 
Parker, 2005, p. 866). 
We address, more precisely, the question of what 
impact the mismatch between management rationale 
and the different sector orientations of participating 
and potentially participating actors has on the perfor-
mance of cross-sectoral collaboration in terms of its 
capacity to recruit relevant actors and create sustaina-
ble and successful working processes.  
To conclude the theory section, Table 2 illustrates 
the hypotheses of mismatch between alternative man-
agement rationales and sector actor orientations rep-
resenting divergent values, processes and strategic 
goals. In the context of this paper, we use the term 
mismatch to describe a situation where the overall 
management rationale and an actor’s orientation are 
guided by different sector logics.  
Previous research shows that a same-sector public-
public background of actors has a positive impact on 
effectiveness in terms of “getting along better”. Our 
questions is whether this result of the positive effects 
of matching backgrounds—and the negative effects of 
non-matching orientations—is also valid for the rela-
tionship between management rationale and individual 
sectoral actors and, if so, whether this correlation holds 
regardless of the kind of management rationale—
bureaucratic or entrepreneurial.  
Table 1. Two management rationales. 
 Bureaucratic  Entrepreneurial 
Goals  Implementing 
government policies, 
accountability  
Value/profit 
maximisation 
Ideology Legislative order/state 
focus 
Market/efficiency 
focus 
Control Centralised/ 
rule-based 
Quasi-centralised/ 
incentives related to 
performance goals 
Structure Hierarchical Quasi-autonomous/ 
delegation  
Decision-
process 
Top-down in 
accordance with 
government policies 
Ad-hoc dictated  
by value 
maximisation 
Table 2. Management rationale and sector orientation. 
  Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial 
Sector 
orientation 
Public 
body 
Match Mismatch 
Private 
company 
Mismatch  Match 
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3. Method and Data 
In order to examine empirically the question of mis-
match and it effects, we have conducted qualitative 
case studies of two instances of cross-sectoral collabo-
ration by scrutinising their structures, processes and 
goals. The case selection is designed so that the two 
cases—the EU programme EQUAL and the Swedish tri-
ple helix programme VINNVÄXT, together include the 
two different management rationales—bureaucratic 
and entrepreneurial—thereby enabling us to explore 
the impact of mismatch, regardless of type of man-
agement rationale. These two instances of collabora-
tion are not viewed here as two equivalent sets of ob-
servations but rather as two complex configurations of 
events and structures (Ragin, 1997). By relating man-
agement rationale to how they perform in terms of re-
cruiting relevant sectoral actors to appropriate joint ac-
tion, we can shed further light on the broader puzzle of 
how the in-built mismatch between the management 
rationale and sector orientations of actors influences 
performance in joint collaboration. 
The EU programme EQUAL and the Swedish triple 
helix programme VINNVÄXT are in many ways distinct-
ly different: the first one operating within the multi-
level EU context, the second one within the Swedish 
regional context. This gives us the advantage of being 
able to empirically explore the effects of mismatch in 
vastly different contexts of governance. At the EU level, 
the EQUAL programme is a component of the Europe-
an Employment Strategy (EES), while VINNVÄXT, which 
is a part of the Swedish Regional Development and 
Economic Growth Policy, is a government initiative. 
Both programmes enjoy strong political support. The 
EU, with a limited legislative mandate, needs to apply 
new forms of policy making such as allocating structur-
al funds to support public-private partnerships in the 
development of new ways of implementing employ-
ment policies (European Commission, 2009):  
…the top challenge for the EU today must be to 
prevent high levels of unemployment, to boost job 
creation (…) This will only be achieved with strong 
co-operation between all the stakeholders, better 
policy coordination and mutual learning… 
In the Swedish case, long-standing corporatist policy 
making, in particular in labour market policy, paves the 
way for novel measures in innovation and employment 
creation. This legacy supports consultation between 
politicians, the public administration and organised in-
terests at the local level, involving a broad range of lo-
cal business and public interests in decision making 
(Hall & Montin, 2007, p. 2ll). The fundamental notion 
of the Swedish triple helix programme that aims to 
create new jobs by enhancing co-operation horizontal-
ly between public sector and business actors, is defined 
as (Westerberg, 2009, p. 51):  
A very decisive interaction is taking place in the in-
novation system between three groups of actors—
industry, academia and the public sector. 
The empirical materials consist of evaluation reports, 
which offer detailed descriptions of collaboration and 
provide rich and focused accounts of processes and ob-
jectives in each case. For the EQUAL programme, the EU 
has commissioned a number of evaluations conducted 
by major international consultancy companies, such as 
Bernard Brunhes International and ECONOMIX Research 
& Consulting. In the case of the Swedish triple helix 
VINNVÄXT, the government has produced several evalu-
ation reports. Relying on these secondary sources—in 
many cases comprehensive investigations—for the em-
pirical analyses is to some extent a methodological limi-
tation, as these investigations were originally conducted 
for purposes other than to examine the question of the 
mismatch. However, the choice of material provides ac-
cess to empirical data that would otherwise be very 
costly and, to some extent, perhaps even very difficult to 
gain access to. The evaluation reports not only offer crit-
ical descriptions of these two empirical cases. They are 
also based on reliable, high quality empirical research. 
The final “EU-Wide Evaluation Report” covers activi-
ties of EQUAL between 2001 and 2006 and is based on 
national evaluation reports, case studies of transnational 
partnerships, interviews with managing authorities in 
member states, participant observation and surveys 
among participants. The 335-page report covers the 
strategies in EQUAL as well as “management and im-
plementation systems” (Bernard Bruhnes International, 
2006, xii). Similarly, the two others evaluations, Synthe-
sis/EU10 Member States, and Synthesis/EUR-15 Mem-
ber States are each based on national evaluations stud-
ies and additional interviews with national evaluators 
and representatives of managing authorities. The aim of 
the EU Commission is to use of this documentation in 
the “preparation, management, monitoring and evalua-
tion of future programmes, and to facilitate the post-
evaluation of the programme” (Economix, Research & 
Consulting, 2009, vii). The empirical data for the Swedish 
case consists of a study VR 2009:19 and VR 2008:08 
conducted by VINNOVA (Swedish Governmental Agency 
for Innovation Systems), based on 52 interviews with 
participants in eight VINNVÄXT processes. In addition, the 
empirical materials include a research report R 2004:10 by 
NUTEK (Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional 
Growth) on how small companies collaborate with other 
actors, based on a survey including 5,000 firms.  
4. Tools for Developing European Employment 
Strategy  
Enforcement, management and persuasion are three 
 Politics and Governance, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 43-56 48 
central implementation strategies in the EU Social Poli-
cy, (Hartlapp, 2007), while common guidelines and sys-
tems of standards and indicators are employed to cre-
ate shared “EU knowledge” (Mosher & Trubek, 2003) 
and even a “hegemonic discourse” (Haahr, 2004). Vol-
untary policy co-ordination through public-private col-
laboration, albeit under the “shadow of the hierarchy” 
of the Commission (Smismans, 2008), is a well-
established method.  
In its directive C2000 853 Establishing the guide-
lines for the Community Initiative EQUAL, the Commis-
sion establishes the key principles of EQUAL cross-
sectoral collaboration: in order for the European Em-
ployment Strategy (EES) to be fully effective, it must be 
translated into action at the local and regional levels, in 
urban and rural districts—i.e., in contexts that are able 
to generate local co-operation (European Commission, 
2000). Therefore, the EU allocates structural funds to 
support cross-sectoral partnership, the goal of which is 
to promote policy learning across sectors and levels of 
governance. The main goal of EQUAL is to provide a 
“testing ground for the development and dissemination 
of new ways of delivering employment policies” (Euro-
pean Commission, 2000), and thereby helping to imple-
ment the main goals of the EES (Ramboll, Euréval, & 
SEOR, 2010): to create conditions for a socially inclusive 
labour market and high levels of employment. For the 
period 2000–2006, the EU funded EQUAL with 3.2 billion 
euros, which was supplemented with national co-funding 
of over 2.2 billion euros. During the period 2007–2013, 
the European Social Fund disseminated the lessons 
learned from EQUAL by using approximately 3 billion eu-
ros for transnational cross-sectoral co-operation.  
EQUAL guidelines state that public-private partner-
ships have a good potential for promoting “joint efforts” 
and “transfer of experience and good practice” in the 
main areas of the EES. Thus, innovation, mainstreaming, 
empowerment and transnationality are the principles 
that inform the workings of the development partner-
ships. In order to qualify for funding, a partnership needs 
to bring together relevant and central actors on a geo-
graphical or sectoral level, including public bodies, busi-
ness actors, social partners and civil society organisa-
tions. The role of public bodies in the collaboration is to 
ensure a good correspondence between the work that is 
carried out through partnerships and the development 
needs of the territory, so that the innovative employ-
ment measures can be disseminated horizontally to or-
ganisations in the same field and vertically to regional 
and national policy makers and mainstreamed in regular 
employment policies (European Commission, 2000).  
Our first question here is how the EQUAL pro-
gramme performs in terms of organising the working 
process. What kind of management rationale charac-
terised the programme, and which values, principles 
and processes constitute the framework for managing 
the partnerships?  
4.1. Management Processes—Experiences of 
Bureaucratic Rationale 
During 2000–2006, EQUAL funded 1,352 cross-sector 
partnerships. The evaluation reports offer detailed de-
scriptions of the ideology of the programme, its goals 
in terms of accountability or value maximisation, and 
its structure in terms of being hierarchical or quasi-
autonomous. 
Following the two leading programme ideas—
innovation and empowerment—the EQUAL guidelines 
recommend “democratic”, or at least participatory 
governance, mechanisms and also that “those involved 
in the implementation of activities should also take 
part in decision making” (Bernard Bruhnes Internation-
al, 2006, p. 57), which suggests inclusive and perhaps 
even empowering decision making processes for public 
and private sectoral actors in the partnerships. During 
the first round of the partnerships, however, such “ful-
ly participative mechanisms” were criticised for being 
cumbersome and less sustainable (Bernard Bruhnes In-
ternational, 2006, pp. 65-68) and were successively re-
placed with processes of increased streamlining, cen-
tralisation and specialisation in decision making. The 
decision making processes came to resemble a classic 
hierarchical model. 
How did the actors involved experience the EQUAL 
management rationale? Indeed, several sectoral actors 
and, in particular, the beneficiaries of measures, found 
it difficult to follow the intricacies of project manage-
ment, which, according to evaluators, may have had “a 
disempowering rather than an empowering effect” 
(Bernard Bruhnes International, 2006, p. 67). The pro-
gramme terminology was criticised for being highly 
complex and difficult to grasp. Sometimes it required 
conscious efforts on the part of lead partners to ex-
plain it, and participants that were more familiar with 
EU programmes helped the less experienced ones. 
Several evaluation reports brought up the problem of 
what could be labelled “bureaucratic overload” 
(Economix, Research & Consulting, 2009, p. 7):  
During the interviews with the Managing Authori-
ties and the National Support Structures it became 
clear that a heavy administrative system represent-
ed a major problem for many new Member States. 
Not only was the reporting time consuming for DPs, 
but also for Managing Authorities and National 
Support Structures as they concentrated their re-
sources on checking financial claims for compliance 
and eligibility, and formal completeness of monitor-
ing reports. 
Further (Economix, Research & Consulting, 2009, p. 10): 
Evaluators as well as Managing Authorities them-
selves perceived the administrative processes as be-
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ing not efficient from the Programme’s implementa-
tion view point...Administrative requirements at DP 
level (including technical and financial reporting, ap-
plication of public procurement rules) were consum-
ing important time and human resources.  
However, there was some improvement in the EQUAL 
management routines later in the programme period 
(Bernard Brunhes Internacional, 2009, p. 34): 
Monitoring systems used by Member States 
evolved throughout the life-cycle of EQUAL. While 
in round 1 they were classified as “highly bureau-
cratic” and “with too much focus on financial data”, 
in round 2, monitoring systems were simplified and 
improved. 
In short, EQUAL represents many of the traits that signi-
fy cross-sector collaboration with a bureaucratic man-
agement rationale. There was intense use of formalised 
procedures for rule following involving written con-
tracts, standardised information collection and a com-
prehensive system for reporting. The evaluations reveal 
that ESF and its national and regional bodies emphasise 
formalised inter-organisational relations for EQUAL 
partnerships, based on contracts covering planned activ-
ities and use of economic resources. The regular moni-
toring activities include documented procedures for con-
trolling partnership activities and their results, economic 
transactions and daily log/time reports for those work-
ing in a partnership, under the supervision of the repre-
sentatives for regional and local ESF bodies. 
In order to receive continuous funding during its 
lifetime, a partnership needed to produce approved 
accountability reports on a regular basis that followed 
a detailed and standardised model. In brief, it is possi-
ble to conclude that the question of accountability ap-
pears to be a more central goal for the Commission 
than value maximisation. What was initially based on 
ideas of innovative and voluntary policy learning and 
co-ordination between business actors and public bod-
ies in the EQUAL partnerships was transformed by 
means of contracts, specific project terminology and 
regularly monitoring of activities with the help of fiscal 
and activity reports into a process that was criticised 
for its lack of effectiveness.  
With the comprehensive system of accountability 
reports follows a structure that is relatively hierar-
chical, with only limited leeway for activities other than 
those planned, budgeted and approved in advance. 
Control over the activities was centralised, with little, if 
any, ad hoc decision-making. To sum up, several of 
these factors indicate that the EQUAL management 
represented a hierarchical management rationale. Pe-
ters identifies as one of the four possible problems of 
bureaucracy “an excessive action” on part of the insti-
tution (Peters, 2010, p. 267). In the case of the EQUAL’s 
management rationale, the critics would probably 
agree on such a verdict. 
4.2. Mismatch—Quest for Business Actors 
The success of cross-sector collaboration depends on 
its capacity to attract and recruit relevant public and 
private organisations. When assessing the outcome of 
EQUAL, an important question is whether the partner-
ships, in accordance with the programme guidelines, 
succeed in engaging smaller and larger organisations as 
well as public bodies and private sectoral actors.  
First, which actors have qualified for EQUAL mem-
bership? The results (Bernard Bruhnes International, 
2006) show that public authorities and education and 
training organisations are the most frequent lead part-
ners, 46 per cent in total, while business actors and so-
cial partners participate more often merely as “regu-
lar” partners. All in all, private enterprises comprise 
only 12 per cent of the sectoral actors involved, and 
their share is even lower among lead partners: only 9 
per cent. It is, thus, hardly surprising that several na-
tional evaluators expressed criticism concerning the 
low level of involvement of business actors in EQUAL 
(Bernard Brunhes Internacional, 2009, p. 8):  
National evaluators often criticized the weak involve-
ment of private companies. A higher involvement 
would have been useful, as it would have created a 
deeper understanding of the problem as well as it 
would have helped searching for possible solutions, as 
argued for instance by the LV evaluator. The EU-wide 
final evaluation report of 2006 showed that also in 
the old Member States the involvement of the private 
sector was considered as low and difficulties in attract-
ing the private sector to engage in projects dealing 
with inequalities and discrimination were named. 
In addition, it became apparent that it was difficult for 
companies to maintain participation throughout a 
partnership life cycle (Bernard Bruhnes International, 
2006, pp. 57-59). More often, they terminated partici-
pation in the middle of the partnership period. In sum, 
the picture is very much one of public sector bodies be-
ing the relevant and strategic key players. When scru-
tinising “partnership composition and inclusiveness”, 
the evaluation report expresses concerns over whether 
the partnerships in reality meet the requirements of 
“large institutional representation” and “professional-
ism and expertise”, thereby “ensuring the coverage of 
the full range of required skills”.  
The evaluation reports do not provide any infor-
mation about the motives behind the participation of 
business companies nor about their reasons for not 
joining. However, the management rationale of EQUAL, 
with its normative framework, is far from an entrepre-
neurial market rationale stressing values of efficiency 
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and cost-effectiveness. This may explain the limited 
participation of private companies.  
Whether we try to account for the choice to partic-
ipate or not on the part of a company based on rational 
actor explanations in terms of interest maximisation or 
based on a picture of business actors as guided by 
norms and values embedded in the market sector ori-
entation, it is not difficult to see why EQUAL failed to 
attract them. If companies are conceptualised as being 
maximisers of their economic utilities, we can assume 
that they would be very careful about how they invest 
their limited resources and thus be reluctant to deal 
with the extensive and time consuming administrative 
routines of EQUAL. Importantly, the programme did 
not promise any immediate measurable outcomes, on-
ly long-term deliverables in terms of “developing inno-
vative measures for inclusive labour marker policies”.  
The alternative explanation focuses on differences 
in appropriateness norms between the management 
rationale of EQUAL and the sector orientation of the 
business companies. There is obviously a gap between 
EQUAL’s ideal of empowering participatory democratic 
process, though later implemented as a top-down 
command and control process, and the private sector 
understanding of what an appropriate way of imple-
menting a project is as follows: measurable economic 
feedback on time and human resources invested in col-
laboration. The explanation for the reluctance on part 
of the companies to participate in EQUAL would then 
be the difference between the norms the EQUAL man-
agement rationale prescribes and the role expectations 
and norms that business actors embody.  
Public sector organisations will likely find it easier 
to conform to the EQUAL management routines. The 
time consuming administrative procedures, requiring 
continuous documenting of activities and finances, are 
simply more familiar to them, as they coincide with 
public sector logic. So too, EQUAL’s top-down decision-
making process is easier for public sectoral actors to 
identify with and to perceive as reasonable and ap-
propriate. However, this time the management ra-
tionale is not state-focused but EU-centred. While the 
EQUAL objectives stressed innovation and creativity 
and the programme aimed at policy learning across 
sectors and development, as well as dissemination of 
new ways of delivering employment policies, its man-
agement rationale, paradoxically, expressed values of 
hierarchical and detailed management to bring about 
this creativity.  
5. Triple Helix for Swedish Regional Development for 
Economic Growth  
The Swedish Regional Development and Economic 
Growth Policy is based on collaboration between public 
agencies, business actors and interest organisations. 
The Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems, 
VINNOVA, and the Agency for Economic and Regional 
Growth, Tillväxtverket, are a result of the Swedish leg-
acy of supporting close co-operation between market 
actors and public bodies. VINNOVA’s main task is to 
promote sustainable economic growth by funding 
needs-driven research and the development of effec-
tive innovation systems. It initiates, stimulates and 
manages joint activities between public and private ac-
tors in order to increase economic growth and to 
“work to achieve more enterprises, growing enterpris-
es and sustainable, competitive business and industry 
throughout Sweden” (Westerberg, 2009). Historically, 
Swedish governments have been supportive of larger 
export industries, while the situation for small business 
is somewhat different. The role of companies has also 
changed and in globalised markets, the traditional cor-
porate responsibility for local employment has been 
replaced by more general concerns for national and 
global issues.  
According to VINNOVA, in a modern society aiming 
at economic development and job creation, other alli-
ances must come about to replace the old bonds that 
held together the local factory areas (Westerberg, 2009), 
now building on regional enlargement, as well as on ge-
ographical and professional mobility. Demands for cost-
effective but flexible ways of offering the markets new 
products, new services and new jobs thus put pressure on 
business companies to develop alliances so that they can 
share investments that open up access to new markets.  
5.1. Management Rationale of the Triple Helix 
VINNVÄXT Programme 
The VINNOVA programme VINNVÄXT, Regional Growth 
through Dynamic Innovation Systems, aims to promote 
sustainable growth by developing globally competitive 
research and innovation environments in specific 
growth fields (Westerberg, 2009, p. 7). This triple helix 
programme is based on mutual dependence between 
actors from the public and private sectors. Private 
companies need the public sector for infrastructure in 
terms of regulation and service, and research insti-
tutes/universities for training and research. The public 
sector is dependent on a competitive industry and re-
search in order to be able to secure an economically 
sustainable society. 
How is VINNVÄXT managed? Under the auspices of 
the government agency, the corner stone of the pro-
gramme is voluntary regional co-operation between 
research institutes, private sectoral actors and public 
agencies, based on mutual agreements. As regards the 
structure of the programme, it takes the form of com-
petition between regional initiatives which guarantees 
a quasi-autonomous position for the competing units. 
The winning projects receive funding up to one million 
euro per year for a period of ten years. In addition, 
they are offered so-called process support, which takes 
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the form of seminars, training and experience-sharing 
(Westerberg, 2009, p. 12). One of the most central cri-
teria is that a collaboration is considered to have 
growth potential and can be expected to be internation-
ally competitive in its field within ten years (Westerberg, 
2009). From its inception in 2001 until 2012, there have 
been 12 winners. While some of the joint projects test 
new ideas and create arenas for supporting learning, 
others are oriented towards commercial goals. 
Value maximisation is seen as the main objective of 
VINNVÄXT, and incentives are directly related to per-
formance goals. In sum, the management rationale of 
VINNVÄXT represents a highly entrepreneurial orienta-
tion. Evaluation results show that there is good support 
in regions for triple helix partnerships. The report also 
notes that different actor categories may have distinct-
ly different goals and that mutual understanding is re-
quired (Westerberg, 2009). It, therefore, recommends 
learning by “fighting” as a method for increasing reci-
procity between the partners. In short, cross-sectoral 
co-operation is not expected to be without difficulties. 
5.2. What Makes Small Companies Seek Collaboration?  
A central question is whether business actors are inter-
ested in the triple helix government initiative. What 
characterises those business actors that participate in 
cross-sectoral collaboration: is it a last desperate resort 
for a business company that is struggling to survive? 
Or, is it rather good economic growth in a company 
that encourages it to expand the opportunity structure 
through engagement in triple helix? Is partnering a 
component in a company’s entrepreneurial agenda of 
risk taking? Or, is the wish to rely on other actors moti-
vated by a lack of other entrepreneurial initiatives? 
And furthermore, do companies collaborate as a part 
of general investment in competence development, 
accompanied by spending on the education of employ-
ees? Or, is it a way out for market actors that cannot 
afford a development budget of their own?  
A survey by NUTEK (Ylinenpää & Westerberg, 2004, 
p. 10) of 5,000 Swedish firms with 5–50 employees, 
complemented with their annual economic reports, on 
how Swedish companies collaborate in general, and 
with public partners in particular, provides some an-
swers to these questions. Understanding small compa-
nies as isolated from rest of society turns out to give a 
false picture of the private sector, according to the re-
port. While 8 per cent of companies collaborate with 
all three triple helix actor categories, i.e., business ac-
tors, public actors and academic research insti-
tutes/universities, around 15 per cent are engaged in a 
more regular entrepreneurial manner in co-operation 
with other companies, as well as public bodies. The 
largest proportion of small Swedish companies, 37 per 
cent, only cooperates with other market sector actors. 
Finally, 27 per cent of business actors do not co-
operate at all. In short, although co-operation with 
other market actors is the most popular form, collabo-
ration with organisations representing alternate sector 
ideologies and norms—either the public sector or the 
research/academic world—was not that unusual.  
The most often cited reason for cooperating was the 
search for new knowledge (Ylinenpää & Westerberg, 
2004, p. 10). This openness was also demonstrated by 
the correlation between “entrepreneurial behaviour”—
operationalised as a company’s degree of innovative-
ness, pro-activeness and risk propensity—and degree of 
co-operation with actors from other sectors: the higher 
a company’s score on entrepreneurial behaviour, the 
more likely that it cooperates with both public agencies 
and research institutes. In brief, business actors that are 
willing to take risks and are innovative often actively 
seek new cross-sectoral collaboration opportunities. 
A company’s propensity to co-operate with other 
organisations is also positively correlated with its ten-
dency to invest in internal competence development, 
either by providing employees with further education 
or by employing more academics. A factor that appears 
to be particularly important was the share of academ-
ics among the employees. In companies that have no 
partners, the share of employees with a university de-
gree is around 11 per cent. That number is three times 
higher—33 per cent—for those businesses that collab-
orate with all three triple-helix actor categories.  
Although only a minority of companies are involved 
in triple helix, these companies are at the same time 
among the most successful. Co-operation is thus far 
from being the last desperate way for a market actor to 
survive. There is a strong correlation between a com-
pany’s economic growth and its involvement in triple 
helix co-operation. To conclude, the VINNVÄXT pro-
gramme attracts successful companies with a high en-
trepreneurial profile. We can assume that at least part 
of the explanation is the good fit between the entre-
preneurial management rationale of the programme 
and the sector orientation of the private companies. 
The way VINNVÄXT is run—placing emphasis on mar-
ket focus and economic value maximisation and offer-
ing the competing regional partnerships a quasi-
autonomous position, in stark contrast to hierarchical 
decision-making processes and requirements on ac-
countability reports—is clearly an attractive manage-
ment solution for business companies.  
5.3. Public Sector Bodies Acting in a Vacuum  
Our next question is whether VINNVÄXT creates attrac-
tive conditions for public sector bodies and research 
institutes as well. Since triple helix co-operation is initi-
ated and funded by the government, and managed by 
a government agency, VINNOVA, we may assume that 
the participation of public sectoral actors would be 
least problematic in comparison with other triple helix 
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actors. Surprisingly, however, politicians and public 
agencies appear to meet serious obstacles in finding a 
proper way to contribute to the programme (Wester-
berg, 2009, p. 38). As a result, the role of regional gov-
ernment agencies, municipal councils and county gover-
nors is limited in triple helix collaborations. Politicians 
are also more active in the initial stages of the co-
operation than during the later phases. The explana-
tion the evaluation report offers is that the main com-
petence of politicians is on a general level, concerning 
structural and financial questions, and that a lack of 
time and expertise results in a successively declining 
involvement in concrete triple helix project activities. 
In addition, not only politicians, but even civil servants, 
have too little knowledge about commerce and the 
conditions applicable to industry, which makes it hard 
for them to contribute to partnerships.  
Is the source of the problem to be found in the 
mismatch between the highly entrepreneurial man-
agement rationale of the programme and the alternate 
value orientation of public sectoral actors? It is not 
immediately clear that this is the case. The lack of re-
quired knowledge in the area of expertise is not a di-
rect consequence of the choice of management ra-
tionale. Yet, it is possible to argue that it is the 
responsibility of the overall collaboration management 
to create the working conditions, in terms of structure 
and decision-making processes, that enable all of the 
participating actors to contribute to the joint project, 
regardless of their sector backgrounds.  
What about the third partner: research institutes 
and universities? In triple helix, research partners are 
expected to bring in the necessary knowledge for de-
velopment of new products, innovations and technolo-
gy. As we have seen, a high share of academics among 
the staff is positively correlated with a company’s will-
ingness to get involved in a cross-sectoral triple helix 
project. If the share of academics is a key factor, then 
hypothetically research institutes should be highly in-
terested in joining triple helix. However, the report 
shows that their participation is severely hampered by 
the logics of the academic world. The meritocratic pub-
lic sector principles of non-profit making do not travel 
well with the idea of triple helix: state-owned research 
institutes are not allowed to make economic profits on 
new market/industrial products. This is obviously an 
impediment to their participation in triple helix. Taken 
together, these results indicate that there is a mis-
match between the entrepreneurial management ra-
tionale, with its market focus and possibilities to value 
maximisation, and the sector orientations of partici-
pants representing the public sector norms, values and 
working processes. 
6. Mismatch–Collaboration with Benefits and Barriers  
Today, great emphasis is placed on policy co-ordination 
that relies primarily on shared learning and socialisa-
tion. Pooling resources, capacities and competencies 
from both the business sector and public bodies in cross-
sectoral collaboration, such as in the EQUAL programme 
and the Swedish triple helix initiative, is expected to 
bring about beneficial synergy effects, economic growth 
and innovative job creation. Joint action promises to 
make the most of diverse sector competencies.  
We have highlighted empirically the effects of man-
agement rationale on cross-sectoral collaboration in 
these two very different programmes: the first involv-
ing the EU multilevel process, aiming at implementing 
the European Employment Strategy (EES); the latter in-
volving the implementing of Swedish regional policy. As 
shown in the summary of the empirical findings in Ta-
ble 3, the triple helix initiative VINNVÄXT, the main ob-
jective of which is to put into practice a government 
policy for regional economic growth, closely follows 
the entrepreneurial management rationale. EQUAL, in 
contrast, is in many regards strongly guided by a bu-
reaucratic rationale. 
VINNVÄXT, although a state initiative, is keen on 
the idea of profit maximisation—wishing to accomplish 
this at the national level by means of enhancing com-
petition at the regional level by finding the best ways 
to maximise value on their own. With regards to its 
ideology, it could hardly resemble the entrepreneurial 
principles more than it does: efficiency is to be brought 
about by relying on competition as a central market 
mechanism. As concerns government control, this is 
limited since the cross-sectoral projects operate au-
tonomously within the limits of existing legislation. 
Moreover, the entrepreneurial logic is manifested, as 
the initial participation in the joint effort in itself is not 
rewarded. Instead, economic incentives are linked to 
performance goals. 
EQUAL, on the other hand, operates under the EU’s 
centralised and rule-based control. EU regulation takes 
the form of binding contracts and related funding of 
cross-sectoral activities. In terms of ideological posi-
tion, the programme is explicitly based on the centrali-
ty of the EU directive, instead of state legislation, as 
would normally be the case. The system of regular ac-
tivity reports is a central control mechanism, which 
stresses that partnerships are accountable for how 
they implement the EU programme directive. 
The evaluation reports provide a more detailed pic-
ture of the structure and decision-making processes in 
EQUAL than in VINNVÄXT. Even though this might at 
first seem to be a methodological problem, it is also an 
essential empirical result: it tells us about important 
differences between these two programmes. Not only 
is it the case that the EU strictly regulates and monitors 
the working processes in EQUAL; it also provides rich 
public documentation covering the programme and its 
structure and decisions-making processes. We learn, 
for example, that the participatory forms of decision-
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making initially used at the partnership level were later 
abandoned in favour of more centralised processes. In 
contrast, the most central decision in VINNVÄXT was 
the selection of the annual winner. Other than this, 
cross-sectoral collaborations operated autonomously 
from the government, with working processes being nei-
ther regulated nor monitored or documented in detail. 
What, then, can we say about the effects of the 
mismatch, according to Table 4? How did EQUAL and 
VINNVÄXT perform in terms of recruiting relevant ac-
tors and guaranteeing sustainability of collaboration, 
given their divergent management rationales? 
First, public bodies found it easier to adapt to the 
coercive top-down regulations and control in the 
EQUAL programme, which even involved a specific EU 
project terminology that was difficult to cope with for 
those who were not already used to it. This very ra-
tionale, however, deterred business companies from 
getting involved in the programme, and, moreover, the 
ones that participated found it difficult to maintain 
their participation throughout the contracted pro-
gramme period. These results are well in line with re-
search findings, according to which business actors 
with manifest economic interests sometimes tend not 
to make better partners, since their need to prioritise 
short-term returns on investments may conflict with a 
long-term perspective that is required to realise public 
policy targets (Koppenjan & Enserink, 2009, p. 284). In 
brief, the mismatch had consequences for the perfor-
mance of EQUAL, with it failing to recruit relevant ac-
tors or to guarantee sustainability in the collaboration.  
The highly entrepreneurial management rationale 
of the Swedish government initiative VINNVÄXT, which 
is based on the legacy of co-operation between market 
actors and public bodies and which sees joint public-
private action as necessary for opening access to new 
markets and new products, was, by contrast, attractive 
to business companies. In addition, the matching dis-
positions of market actors and the triple helix pro-
gramme’s entrepreneurial management rationale was 
also manifested in primarily attracting companies that 
are successful, have a strong entrepreneurial profile, 
have a propensity for risk taking and are provided with 
good resources. Companies that instead tend to ab-
stain from cross-sectoral collaboration are often those 
with weaker entrepreneurial behaviour and lower eco-
nomic growth. 
There is also evidence of a mismatch between the 
entrepreneurial rationale and the orientation of public 
sector actors in VINNVÄXT: the public sector actors had 
difficulties in contributing to joint action after the initial 
stages of the collaboration as their limited knowledge of 
the conditions for the business sector and industry 
made it difficult for them to fully participate. An inter-
esting question is, then, whether it is reasonable to re-
Table 3. Management rationales of EQUAL and VINNVÄXT. 
 Bureaucratic  Entrepreneurial 
Goals  Implementing government policies, accountability  Value/profit maximisation 
 EQUAL: implementing EU programme/EES policy 
VINNVÄXT: Swedish government policy  
VINNVÄXT: regional profit  
maximisation 
Ideology Legislative order/state focus Market/efficiency focus 
 EQUAL: EU directive focus VINNVÄXT: efficiency by means of competition 
Control Centralised/rule-based Quasi-centralised/incentives related to performance 
goals 
 EQUAL: EU-centred, contract-based  VINNVÄXT: the winning  
collaboration receives a prize  
Structure Hierarchical Quasi-autonomous/delegation  
 EQUAL: regulated, top-down  VINNVÄXT: autonomous regional collaborating units 
Decision-
process 
Top-down in accordance with government policies Ad-hoc dictated by value maximisation 
 EQUAL: top-down, centralised regulated and 
monitored  
VINNVÄXT: to identify the yearly prize winner 
 
Table 4. Management rationale and mismatch in 
EQUAL and VINNVÄXT. 
Management rationale 
  Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial 
Sector 
orientation 
Public  
body 
Match Mismatch  
VINNVÄXT  
Private 
company 
Mismatch 
EQUAL 
Match 
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quire public agencies and politicians to possess that 
kind of knowledge and, if so, in how much detail? Is it 
possible to argue why should they? Indeed, in a neo-
Weberian state professionalisation of public services 
implies that a “bureaucrat” not only masters existing 
legislation in a given area of expertise but that he/she 
is also professional in terms of being able to meet the 
concrete needs of the users of public service (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2011, p. 119). To the extent that business 
companies and industry are considered to be users of 
public service, the answer is affirmative.   
The participation of state-run research institutes is 
central to the Swedish triple helix initiatives. However, 
it also appeared to be somewhat problematic. The en-
trepreneurial management rationale, in that it stresses 
economic value maximisation, is not very compatible 
with meritocratic principles of state-owned research 
institutes/universities: being public sector bodies, their 
incentive structure does not allow economic gains, and 
nor does it encourage collaboration with private com-
panies for that purpose. 
7. Concluding Discussion—Closing the Gap?  
In conclusion, while acknowledging the methodological 
limitations of the empirical study as it relies on second-
ary sources, the main findings suggest that the man-
agement rationale for cross-sectoral collaboration—
bureaucratic or entrepreneurial—is an important fac-
tor in the construction of successful and sustainable 
joint action. The present results lend some support to 
previous research, which indicate that an entrepreneuri-
ally oriented approach is associated with better perfor-
mance, in terms of the capacity to recruit relevant actors 
and establish sustainable collaboration. In comparison 
with VINNVÄXT, EQUAL experienced more severe prob-
lems in attempting to engage relevant collaborators.  
Diversity in cross-sectoral collaboration, while being 
not only constitutive of, but also associated with high 
innovation potential, can also become a constraining 
factor in terms of the mismatch between the overall 
management rationale and the sector orientations of 
the participants. This holds true, regardless of the 
management rationale—bureaucratic or entrepreneur-
ial. In EQUAL, the mismatch occurs between the bu-
reaucratic rationale and the orientation of the business 
actors, and in the Swedish VINNVÄXT programme, be-
tween the entrepreneurial rationale and public sector 
orientation of civil servants, politicians and state-run 
research institutes. In both cases the mismatch reduces 
the opportunities for some of the participants to fully 
contribute to the joint project. The opposite also holds 
true, i.e., when the management rationale coincides 
with the same-sector logic of a collaborator, the latter 
is more likely to make a positive contribution.  
Differences in underlying sector appropriateness 
norms still play an important role. Not only do same-
sector public-public collaborations perform better in 
terms of effectiveness than cross-sectoral ones, as earli-
er research indicates, the theory that same sector back-
ground has a positive effect is also valid on the next lev-
el, i.e., for the relationship between the management 
rationale and the sector background of the actor. 
Finally, the empirical results raise an interesting 
question about whether it would be possible to over-
come, or at least to regulate, the negative effects of 
mismatch and thereby secure the positive synergy ef-
fects of bringing together different sector competenc-
es, perspectives and knowledge. The question of how 
to close the mismatch gap is especially vital for practi-
tioners and policy-makers.  
What could management do about the mismatch? 
If the cause of the problem is defined as a lack of in-
centives for rational actors, calculating possible costs 
and benefits, to contribute, then one solution could be 
to adjust the incentive structure so that it more strong-
ly favours co-operation. Conversely, if the organisa-
tional norms shaping the actions of participants and 
potential participants are seen as being be the main 
source of the problem, the solution is to influence the 
norms and role expectations of the actors. In 
VINNVÄXT, a solution for entrepreneurially oriented 
management could be to show special concern for 
public sector participants, perhaps by using economic 
incentives to empower them so that they become 
more knowledgeable about the workings of the private 
sector and could thereby more fully contribute to the 
collaboration. An alternative would be to alter their 
norms and role perceptions so that they see it as a le-
gitimate requirement for modern public sector repre-
sentatives, if not to be experts on, at least to be well 
informed about the conditions of business companies 
and industry. If the participation of research institutes 
is regarded as so crucial, a solution might be to stress 
the norm of social responsibility in the same manner 
that business companies adopt the imperative of cor-
porate social responsibility. An alternative is to modify 
the incentive structure so that it better rewards them 
for collaboration with market actors.  
The situation is somewhat different in the case of 
EQUAL. Since collaborators are already initially funded 
for their participation, it is less plausible that additional 
economic benefits, used as a means of changing the in-
centive structure for utility-maximising actors, would 
make any substantial difference in the willingness of 
business companies to participate. Here, the manage-
ment could choose an alternative approach and see 
the problem as primarily caused by misperceptions on 
the part of business actors of proper role expectations. 
In this case, investing in norm building, by stressing the 
norm of corporate social responsibility and thereby 
creating greater acceptance for EQUAL’s management 
rationale, for example, might be a possible direction 
which could be pursued. 
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